AbstractÐA distributed system is said to be self-stabilizing if it converges to safe states regardless of its initial state. In this paper we present our results of using symbolic model checking to verify distributed algorithms against the self-stabilizing property. In general, the most difficult problem with model checking is state explosion; it is especially serious in verifying the self-stabilizing property, since it requires the examination of all possible initial states. So far applying model checking to self-stabilizing algorithms has not been successful due to the problem of state explosion. In order to overcome this difficulty, we propose to use symbolic model checking for this purpose. Symbolic model checking is a verification method which uses Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDs) to compactly represent state spaces. Unlike other model checking techniques, this method has the advantage that most of its computations do not depend on the initial states. We show how to verify the correctness of algorithms by means of SMV, a well-known symbolic model checker. By applying the proposed approach to several algorithms in the literature, we demonstrate empirically that the state spaces of self-stabilizing algorithms can be represented by OBDDs very efficiently. Through these case studies, we also demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed approach in detecting errors.
INTRODUCTION
A DISTRIBUTED system is said to be self-stabilizing if it satisfies the following two properties: 1) ConvergenceÐthe system reaches a safe state regardless of its initial state, and 2) closureÐonce the system reaches a safe state, it continues to be within the set of safe states. The idea of selfstabilization was first introduced to computer science by Dijkstra [5] . This idea, which originally had a very narrow scope of application, has attracted much research interest in recent years (cf. [22] ). In general, a self-stabilizing system has two useful properties: 1) It need not be initialized, and 2) it can recover from transient faults that may change its state. These properties are very useful in distributed environments where no centralized control exists.
In this paper, we discuss automatic verification of selfstabilizing algorithms. Automatic verification is relatively unexplored in the field of self-stabilizing algorithms, due to its awkwardness.
There are two distinct traditions in automatic verification. One is mechanical theorem proving, and the other is model checking. The first approach has been discussed by several researchers in the context of self-stabilizing algorithms. In [19] , Prasetya verified a self-stabilizing minimum-cost routing algorithm using the HOL proof checking system [9] .
In [20] , Qadeer and Shankar applied PVS [17] to prove the correctness of Dijkstra's self-stabilizing ring algorithm [5] . Recently, Kulkarni et al. [15] also proved the correctness of the Dijkstra's algorithm using PVS in a different fashion. Generally, mechanical theorem proving is a highly powerful and flexible approach. For example, it can be used for reasoning about infinite state systems. Unfortunately, this approach can involve generating and proving many lemmas to verify the correctness of systems. Although this process can be automated to some extent by means of proof checking systems, proofs must still be constructed mainly by hand. Consequently, mechanical theorem proving can be performed only by experts who have considerable experience in logical reasoning.
The second approach to automatic verification, the model checking, is the process of exploring a finite state space to determine whether or not a given property holds. This is often the easiest way to verify distributed algorithms; however, it is more limited. This leads to disadvantages, such as only being able to apply it to finite state systems, and it is impractical when the state space is very large, even though it is finite. The latter problem, which often occurs when the system being verified has many components, is usually referred to as the state explosion problem.
At the same time, model checking has two remarkable advantages; first, it is fully automatic and its application does not require the user to have mathematical knowledge such as theorem proving. Second, when the design fails to satisfy a desired property, the process of model checking produces a counterexample that demonstrates a behavior which invalidates the property. Therefore, the use of model checking can be useful for algorithm designers who need to validate distributed algorithms, especially in early stages of development.
However, since the state explosion problem is especially serious in verifying a self-stabilizing algorithm, applying model checking to them has not been successful so far (note that since any state can be the initial state, the set of the reachable states is exactly the same as the Cartesian product of sets of states of all components). As far as we know, the only work that reports the results of using model checking for verifying self-stabilization is the one by Shukla et al. [23] . For two distributed algorithms, they verified whether the system converges to safe states from a given initial state, using a software tool called SPIN [12] . Nevertheless, their method cannot be directly used for verifying whether this property holds for all possible initial states. This problem can be alleviated by minor modifications that allow any state to be an initial state. As shown later, however, these modifications render the method infeasible even for small systems.
To overcome the problem of applying model checking to self-stabilizing algorithms, we propose to use CTL symbolic model checking (symbolic model checking, for short). This method controls the state explosion problem by using Boolean functions to implicitly represent the state space. Since Boolean functions can be often represented by Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDs) very compactly, the symbolic model checking method can reduce the memory and time required for analysis. By manipulating the Boolean functions, the method can determine whether a system meets a given property that is specified using CTL [3] , a branching time temporal logic.
Compared to other model checking approaches, the symbolic model checking method has several features that are appropriate for verifying self-stabilizing algorithms. First, since most of the computations required by the method do not depend on reachability of states, the property that any state can be the initial state never becomes an obstacle to verification. Second, the selfstabilizing property can be expressed by a simple CTL formula. Third, as will be empirically shown later, the state spaces of self-stabilizing systems can be represented very compactly by using OBDDs. Besides, a symbolic model checking tool called SMV (Symbolic Model Verifier) [16] is widely available.
In this paper, we investigate how we can verify algorithms against the self-stabilizing property by using SMV. To illustrate the feasibility of our approach, we describe the results of applying it to several algorithms proposed in the literature. During the verification process, we found an error in one of these algorithms [26] .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we describe the concept of self-stabilizing algorithms; in Section 3, we briefly explain symbolic model checking and the symbolic model checker SMV. In Section 4, we present how to verify distributed algorithms against the self-stabilizing property by using SMV. By applying the approach to several algorithms, we demonstrate its applicability in Section 5. For comparative purposes, we show the results of using SPIN, a model checker based on explicit state enumeration, for validation of a self-stabilizing algorithm in Section 6; and we conclude our paper with a brief summary in Section 7.
SELF-STABILIZING ALGORITHMS

Models and Definitions
We consider a distributed system that consists of n processes, p H Y p I Y p P Y Á Á Á Y p nÀI . For convenience, the subscripts on p i are assumed to be modulo n. The topology of the system is modeled by an undirected graph of which each vertex corresponds to a process. Process p i can communicate with another process, p j , if p i and p j are adjacent to each other on the graph.
We consider two models of communication: In the statereading model, each process can directly read the internal state of its neighboring processes; in the link-register model, processes can communicate with each other only by using separate registers. In the latter model, there are two registers ij and ji for each adjacent pair of processes p i and p j . Process p j can read the state of ij but not the state of p i itself, and only p i can change the state of ij . We call ij and ji the output register and the input register of p i for p j , respectively. Thus, ij is the input register of p j for p i . The number of registers is denoted by l.
We assume that the number of the states of each component (process or register) of the system is finite and we define the global state of the system as the vector of the states of all components. Therefore, the set of all global states, denoted by q, is given as follows:
. the state-reading model q H Â I Â Á Á Á Â nÀI , and . the link-register model
where i H i n À I and y i H i l À I denote the set of states of p i and the set of states of the i Ith register, respectively.
A distributed algorithm specifies a transition relation for each process p i . Based on the transition relation, p i reads the states of its neighboring processes or its input registers, calculates the next local state, and updates, if needed, its output registers in each step of execution. A distributed algorithm thus specifies the behavior of the system, and in this paper, we limit our discussion to deterministic algorithms.
Concerning selection of processes to run, two types of daemons are considered: the central daemon (c-daemon) and the distributed daemon (d-daemon). If the c-daemon is assumed, then only one process is selected to run at a time, while an arbitrary set of processes is selected to run under the d-daemon. For either type of daemon, we assume it to be fair, that is, we assume that each process is selected infinitely often. We use g3 g H by express the fact that processes in fp H Y p I Y Á Á Á Y p nÀI g are selected at g P q and yield g H P q by their parallel execution. (If is not important or is clear, we may omit it.) An infinite sequence of global
computation is said to be fair if it is produced by a fair daemon. Self-stabilization is defined as follows: Let v be the set of the legitimate (or safe) states in which the system performs correct execution. A distributed system is said to be selfstabilizing if it satisfies the following two properties:
1. ConvergenceÐfor any global state g H P q and any fair computation g H g I g P Á Á Á starting with g H , there is an integer k! H such that g k P v, and 2. ClosureÐfor any global state g P v, g 3 g
An algorithm can be defined as self-stabilizing in a corresponding manner, thus, a self-stabilizing algorithm specifies a self-stabilizing system.
Illustrative Example
Here we take Dijkstra's K-state mutual exclusion algorithm as an illustrative example [5] . Consider a distributed system that consists of n processes connected in the form of a ring, as shown in Fig. 1a . We assume the state-reading model and the existence of the c-daemon, and we define a privilege of a process as its ability to change its current state. This ability is based on a Boolean predicate that consists of its current state and the state of one of its neighboring processes.
We then define the legitimate states as those in which the following two properties hold: 1) exactly one process has a privilege, and 2) every process will eventually have a privilege. These properties correspond to a form of mutual exclusion, because the privileged process can be regarded as the only process that is allowed in its critical section.
In the K-state algorithm, the state of each process is in fHY IY PY Á Á Á Y u À Ig, where u is an integer larger than or equal to n. For any process p i , we use the symbols and v to denote its state and the state of its neighbor p iÀI , respectively, and process p H is treated differently from all other processes. The K-state algorithm is described below. Fig. 1b shows part of a computation of the system with three processes and u R. Although every process has a privilege initially, after two steps the system reaches a state where only one process is privileged. Thereafter, there is exactly one privileged process in the system and each process has privilege infinitely often. The computation shown in Fig. 1b is only an example, since the running processes are selected arbitrarily by the daemon assumed. Nevertheless, one can prove that by using this algorithm the system converges such legitimate states regardless of the initial state and computation [6] .
SYMBOLIC MODEL CHECKING
Model checking is the process of exploring a finite state space to determine whether or not a given property holds. The major problem of model checking is that the state spaces arising from practical problems are often extremely large, generally making exhaustive exploration not feasible.
A promising approach to this problem is the use of symbolic representations of the state space. In CTL symbolic model checking (symbolic model checking for short), Boolean functions represented by Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDs) are used to represent the state space, instead of explicit adjacency-lists. This can reduce dramatically the memory and time required because OBDDs represent many frequently occurring Boolean functions very compactly.
Consider a set of Boolean vectors f ftrueY flseg . Then any subset of f can be represented by a Boolean function (say f) with Boolean variables such that the vector x x P f is in the subset if and only if fx x is true. Since f ftrueY flseg has P elements, P states can thus be handled by using Boolean variables. The transition relation is also represented by a Boolean function p with P variables such that there is a transition from x x to y y if and only if p x xY y y is true (x xY y y P f). Since the Boolean function p can be defined without any information on reachability, it can be constructed regardless of the initial states.
The correctness property to be verified is specified in CTL (Computational Tree Logic) [3] . CTL is a branchingtime temporal logic, extending propositional logic with temporal operators that express how propositions change their truth values over time. Here we only use three temporal operators: AG, AF, and AX. The formula AG p holds in state s if p holds in all states along all computation paths (i.e., sequences of states) starting from s, while the formula AF p holds in state s if p holds in some state along all computation paths starting from s. The formula AX p holds in state s if p holds in all the states that can be reached from s in exactly one step. 1 An atomic proposition is a CTL formula. If f I and f P are CTL formulae, then so are Xf I , f I f P , AF f I , AG f I , and AX f I .
In the process of symbolic model checking, a given CTL formula is evaluated with respect to all the initial states as follows: First, the set of all states where the given property holds is computed from the transition relation function p . This is done by fixed-point iterative techniques which manipulate Boolean functions encoded as OBDDs. (See [2] , [16] for details.) Finally, whether the set obtained contains all initial states is determined. If it contains all the initial states, then the system meets the correctness property.
Only the final phase of the model checking process is thus related to the initial states, and most of the computations required do not depend on the state space reachable from the initial states. Consequently, this characteristic can be a drawback of the symbolic model checking, since the states that are never reached must be explored. However, in the case of self-stabilizing systems, this property never becomes a factor that worsens the verification performance, because all states are necessarily reachable.
VERIFYING SELF-STABILIZATION USING SMV
SMV
SMV (Symbolic Model Verifier) [16] is a software tool for symbolic model checking; it is publicly available and has been especially successful in verifying hardware systems. In this section, we describe how we can use SMV to verify selfstabilizing algorithms.
In SMV, a system (or an algorithm) to be verified is described in a special language called the SMV language. We refer to a system description written in the SMV language as an SMV program. An SMV program is divided into one or more modules, each of which specifies a finite state machine. Each module contains variable declarations to determine its state space and descriptions of the initial state and transition relation of the machine.
Variable declarations are preceded by the keyword VAR. The type associated with a variable can be Boolean or an enumerated type. The transition relation is described by a collection of parallel assignments to the next version of the variables. Assignments of initial values and next values to the variables are preceded by the keyword ASSIGN. Initial states are assigned by specifying the initial values of the variables using the expression init(x), where x is a variable. The expression next(x) is used to refer to the variable x in the next state.
For example, consider a finite state machine that has three states, say sI, sP, and sQ, and suppose that sI is the initial state and that the state nondeterministically changes at every move. This machine is represented in the SMV language as follows:
next(state) := {s1, s2, s3};
For the details of the syntax and semantics of the SMV language, the readers are referred to [16] .
Describing Algorithms in the SMV Language
Here we explain how to represent a distributed algorithm in the SMV language and how to verify it against the selfstabilizing property using SMV. For this purpose, we take the K-state algorithm as an example, assuming that the c-daemon exists. (The d-daemon will be discussed in the next subsection.) Fig. 2 shows the SMV program that represents the K-state algorithm where n Q and u R.
Interaction between Processes
The interaction between processes is specified in the main module. The SMV language allows modular hierarchical descriptions and definition of reusable components. The main module defines the interaction of other modules at a lower level, each of which represents the behavior of a process.
The main module in Fig. 2 declares three processes, p H Y p I , and p P . The behavior of p H and that of p i i IY P are specified by modules type_p and type_q, respectively. The main module also specifies that each process p i i HY IY P can refer to the value of a variable state of another process p iÀI . This corresponds to the fact that the processes are connected in the form of a ring. (As described later, network topologies other than rings can be specified in a similar way.)
In the main module in this program, the three processes are associated with the keyword process. In SMV, such instances of modules are not allowed to run simultaneously. That is, at every step, at most one of them is nondeterministically selected and allowed to update its own state. The SMV program in Fig. 2 thus represents the existence of the c-daemon, which arbitrarily selects one process at a time for running.
Processes
As stated above, the behavior of each process is expressed by a module in the SMV program. The next local state of the process is determined depending on its current local state and the local states of its adjacent processes or registers in the network.
In modules type_p and type_q in Fig. 2 , variable state denotes the state of the corresponding process p i , while L aliases variable state of its left neighbor p iÀI , that is, it denotes the state of the left neighbor.
The keyword DEFINE is used to associate a symbol with a commonly used expression. In type_p and type_q, it is used to assign expressions (state = L) and !(state = L) to symbol priv, respectively. Therefore, priv takes the truth value iff the corresponding process has a privilege. (! represents negation.)
The value of next(state), i.e., the next state of the process changes depending on the values of state and L as follows. The value of a case expression is determined by the first expression on the right hand side of a ª:º such that the condition on the left hand side is true. Thus, for process p H , if priv is true, then the result of the expression is (state + 1) mod 4; otherwise, it is state, which means the value of state does not change. (1 and 0 represent the truth value and the false value, respectively.)
The keyword FAIRNESS and a CTL formula force SMV to verify only computation paths where the CTL formula becomes true infinitely often. Each process has a special variable running which is true iff that process is currently being executed. Thus, by adding the declaration
FAIRNESS running
to each process, we can limit computation paths to be verified to those in which running of every process has the truth value infinitely often. In other words, we thus force every process to be selected to run infinitely often. Clearly this models a fair daemon.
Initial States
In order to determine whether or not the system is selfstabilizing, it is necessary to examine all possible initial states. SMV allows multiple initial states, and we can easily specify that the initial state can be any state.
For example, the state of a process is an integer ranging from 0 to u À I in the K-state algorithm. We can specify that its initial value can take any value within the domain as follows (u R).
init(state) := {0, 1, 2, 3};
The above expression means that the possible initial values of state are 0, 1, 2, and 3. By specifying the initial values of all variables in this way, we can represent the fact that the system can take any initial state.
The Self-Stabilizing Property
As stated above, a self-stabilizing algorithm is defined as one that meets the convergence and closure properties. Now suppose that the predicate that identifies the legitimate states is expressed by CTL formula legitimte. Then,
. the convergence property holds iff CTL formula AF legitimte holds in every global state, and . the closure property holds iff CTL formula legitimte 3 AX legitimte holds in every global state. As a result, the self-stabilizing property is expressed by CTL formula AF legitimte (legitimte 3 AX legitimte).
(Note that the CTL formula is evaluated with respect to all initial states, i.e., all global states.)
Sometimes it is clear that the closure property holds from the definition of the legitimate states. In that case, we need to consider the convergence property only. In Section 5, we will discuss such cases.
In an SMV program, the property to be checked is preceded by the keyword SPEC, as follows. (& and | stand for logical and and logical or, respectively.)
SPEC AF legitimate & (legitimate -> AX legitimate)
In the K-state algorithm, a global state is legitimate iff 1) there is exactly one privileged process in that state, and 2) every process will be eventually privileged in any computation starting with that state. Let priv i represent the fact that process p i has a privilege. Each of the two conditions can be written in CTL as respectively. In Fig. 2 , the above two CTL formulae are denoted by symbols condition1 and condition2, respectively. Hence, legitimte can be written as condition1 & condition2.
Dealing with the Distributed Daemon
When the d-daemon is assumed, describing algorithms in the SMV language is slightly more complicated than the case of the c-daemon. Fig. 3 shows the SMV program for the K-state algorithm under the d-daemon.
To allow multiple processes to run at the same time, keyword process is not used in Fig. 3 . In SMV, a module that is not associated with keyword process is always running. In other words, all processes are selected to run at any given time. Obviously, this is not adequate for representing the d-daemon.
To select an arbitrary set of processes to run, we use an additional variable run in each module. This variable takes a value of either 0 or 1, and the value is randomly selected at any given time. Using the case expressions, we allow each process to actually run only when the value of run is 1.
We verified the K-state algorithm assuming Q n V and u n I. Except for the case of n V and the d-daemon, the verification was completed within a fairly admissible amount of time and the verification result showed that the self-stabilizing property holds. Table 1 shows the performance of the model checking procedure for this example in terms of the verification time, the maximum number of OBDD nodes used at any given time, and the number of nodes of the OBDD that represents the transition relation. (All measurements were performed on a Sun SS20 workstation with 160Mbyte memory. An NA in the table indicates that data was not collected since the verification was not completed within 10 hours.) The table also contains the number of the global states of the system (i.e., jqj). For the K-state algorithm, it is given by u n , since each process has u states.
In this table, one can see that when the number of processes is large, the size of the OBDD that represents the transition relation is extremely smaller than the size of global states. It can also be seen that the time and OBDD nodes used under the assumption of the d-daemon are much larger than the case of the c-daemon. This is because additional variables are used to model the d-daemon, thus leading to a larger state space to be explored.
CASE STUDIES
Example 1: Mutual Exclusion in Special Networks
The proposed approach can also handle network topologies other than rings. Here we take Ghosh's mutual exclusion algorithm as an example [7] . This algorithm works in the special networks as shown in Fig. 4 (m ! P) and needs only two states, 0 and 1, per process. We let s i denote the state of process i. The algorithm is presented below. The symbol represents a binary value.
Based on the verification approach presented in the previous section, we wrote SMV programs that represent the algorithm. Fig. 5 shows the SMV program for the c-daemon. The main module specifies the network topology with m Q. (The DEFINE and SPEC parts in the main module are omitted, since they are the same as the K-state algorithm.)
We performed verification of this algorithm under both the c-daemon and the d-daemon. Table 2 shows the verification results and the performance of the model checking procedure for this example in terms of the verification time and the maximum number of OBDD nodes used at any given time. The table also contains the size of the OBDD that represents the transition relation and the number of global states of the system. For this algorithm, the number of the global states is given by P n since each process has only two states.
Unexpectedly, the time and the maximum size of OBDDs used under the d-daemon were smaller than those values used under the c-daemon, when the number of processes exceeded 10. The reason is that in the case of the d-daemon, the transition relation has a relatively compact OBDD representation.
This phenomenon is consistent with the results of comparing two plausible models of asynchronous circuits [16] . These two models are called the interleaving model and the simultaneous model. In the former model, only one state component changes value in a given transition, while any or all state variables may change state in the latter model. They are thus analogous to the c-daemon and the d-daemon, respectively. In [16] , it is shown that OBDD-based techniques tend to perform better on the simultaneous model, especially when the number of variables is large. Since the addition of variable run, which is unnecessary for the c-daemon model, degrades the verification performance, this phenomenon was observed only when the number of processes was sufficiently large. Unlike Ghosh's algorithm, other self-stabilizing algorithms discussed elsewhere in the paper do not have such similarities to hardware circuits, since variables in these algorithms have a much larger domain than a Boolean variable has. Actually, such a phenomenon was not observed in the verification of these algorithms.
Example 2: Leader Election on Uniform Rings
Both of the two algorithms discussed before are used for achieving mutual exclusion. In the rest of the section, we show that the proposed approach can also be applied to algorithms used to solve other problems.
In this section, we discuss the leader election problem on rings, which is the problem of selecting one process as a leader on a ring where no distinguished process initially exists. Consider a ring that consists of n processes, p H Y p I Y Á Á Á Y p nÀI , that are connected in this order; and assume that the ring is uniform; that is, all the processes on the ring have no identifiers and execute the same algorithm. Subscripts are thus used only for explanation purposes, and processes cannot make use of them.
In [13] , Huang proposed a self-stabilizing leader election algorithm that works on rings of primal size under the c-daemon. In the algorithm, the state of each process is in fHY IY PY Á Á Á Y n À Ig. A process is considered to be a leader iff the state is 0. For any process p i , we use the symbols , v, . process p i i HY IY PY Á Á Á Y n À I if (x y and y n) f X I mod nY g if (x`y) f X I mod nY gX We define a global state to be legitimate iff 1) in that state, there is exactly one process (say p i ) such that p i is a leader and other n À I processes are not a leader, and 2) this property will always hold at any state in every computation starting with the state. A leader election algorithm is considered self-stabilizing iff the system that runs the algorithm reaches a legitimate state regardless of the initial state. Note that the closure property is already taken into consideration in the definition of the legitimate states. Now let leder i be the predicate that is true iff only p i is a leader. By definition, the legitimate states are the states in which AG leder H AG leder I Á Á Á AG leder nÀI holds. The self-stabilizing property can then be written in CTL as AF (AG leder H AG leder I Á Á Á AG leder nÀI ). Fig. 6 shows an SMV program that describes this algorithm when n Q.
Although the algorithm assumes the c-daemon and rings of primal size, we verified the algorithm in the case of the d-daemon and/or rings of composite size, in order to demonstrate how SMV works when a given correctness property does not hold. Table 3 shows the results of the verification. (Note that Huang proved that no uniform, deterministic self-stabilizing leader algorithm exists if n is composite [13] .) These results show that the algorithm does not work under the d-daemon even if n is prime. When an SMV program does not meet a given property to be checked, SMV provides a computation path on which the property does not hold. In the case of n Q and the d-daemon, for example, SMV detected the following computation, which never reaches a legitimate state.
3Table 3 also shows the performance of the model checking procedure and the number of the global states, which is n n since each process has n local states in this algorithm.
Example 3: Ring Orientation
The next problem we consider is ring orientation, which is the problem of orienting a ring in one direction where each node has no sense of direction. We assume that each process p i cannot tell which of its two adjacent processes is p iÀI or p iI and that the ring is uniform as in the previous example.
During the execution of a ring orientation algorithm, each process chooses one of its adjacent processes as the forward process and the other as the backward process. We denote the forward process of p i by p orwp i .
Let e I and e P denote the two processes adjacent to p i . We assume that each process p i has a variable dir P ffY p g Fig. 6 . An SMV program for the leader election algorithm (n Q).
TABLE 3 Verification Results and Performance for the Leader Election Algorithm
to represent its decision in such a way that p orwp i e I iff dir f and p orwp i e P iff dir p . Then we say that a ring is oriented iff exactly one of the following two conditions holds: (Condition 1) p orwp i p iÀI for all i HY IY Á Á Á Y n À I, or (Condition 2) p orwp i p iI for all i HY IY Á Á Á Y n À I.
In [11] , Hoepman proposed uniform self-stabilizing ringorientation algorithms for rings of odd size both for the state-reading model and the link-register model. In this paper, we take the algorithm for the state-reading model. In the algorithm, each process has two Boolean variables, and , in addition to dir. The following is such an algorithm where I and I denote the values of and of e I, and similarly, P and P denote the values of and of e P.
.
if XI P and I X P I f X X; X H; dir X fY g if ((I XP and I ) or (XI P and P)) f X X Y g.
In the ring orientation problem, a global state is legitimate iff 1) in that state the ring is oriented in one direction, i.e., one of the above two conditions holds, and 2) the ring will be oriented in the same direction at any state in every computation starting with that state. A ring orientation algorithm is self-stabilizing iff it reaches a legitimate state from any initial state.
Let gonditionI (gonditionP) be true iff Condition 1 (Condition 2) holds. The legitimate states can then be defined as those where AG gonditionI AG gonditionP holds. Hence, the self-stabilizing property is written in CTL as AF (AG gonditionI AG gonditionP). [11] process p i does not know which of its two adjacent processes, e I and e P, is p iÀI and which is p iI . This fact means that it is necessary to consider two cases for each process p i in verification, that is, the case where e I p iÀI and e P p iI and the case where e I p iI and e P p iÀI . Thus, we have to check a total of P n cases to verify the algorithm. In order to handle the P n cases at a time, we add a special variable AP1_pc(e I p) to each process in the SMV program shown in Fig. 7 . In the SMV program, the variable takes a value of either -1 or 1. If e I p for process p i has a value of -1, then e I p iÀI and e P p iI ; otherwise, e I p iI and e P p iÀI . By allowing nondeterministic choice of the initial value of e I p, we can verify all the P n cases at one try. Note that p orwp i p iÀI holds iff dir f e I p ÀI or dir p e I p I. Let predicate des i be true iff p orwp i p iÀI holds. Then Condition 1 can be written as des H des I Á Á Á des nÀI , while Condition 2 is given by Xdes H Xdes I Á Á Á Xdes nÀI . Although the algorithm assumes the c-daemon and rings with an odd number of processes, we verified the algorithm in the case of the d-daemon and/or rings with an even number of processes. Table 4 shows the results of verification. Note that no uniform and deterministic selfstabilizing ring orientation algorithm exists if n is even [14] . In [14] , it is also proven that no uniform and deterministic self-stabilizing ring orientation algorithm exists under the d-daemon in the state-reading model. As shown in the table, the verification results are consistent with this impossibility result.
This table also shows the performance of the model checking procedure for this example in terms of the verification time and the maximum number of OBDD nodes used at any given time. The table also contains the size of the OBDD for the transition relation and the number of the global states of the system, which is V n since each process has eight local states.
Example 4: Ring Orientation in the Link-Register Model
The four algorithms discussed above assume the statereading model, in which processes can read the states of other processes directly. Here we take an algorithm that works in the link-register model. The algorithm, which is proposed by Umemoto et al. in [26] , is also for ring orientation. This algorithm is designed to run on rings of odd size under the d-daemon. (Note that no deterministic ring orientation algorithm exists when n is even.) As described before, communication is done by means of registers in the link-register model. Since we assume that the topology of the system is a ring, there are a total of Pn
Each process has two adjacent processes e I and e P. For each adjacent process e I (e P), we denote its output register by yI (yP) and its input register by sI (sP). Fig. 8 shows the algorithm. As shown in the figure, this algorithm works according to two sets of five rules. The state of each component (process and register) is a tuple lelY dir, where lel P fHY IY rg and dir P fp Y fg. Thus each component has six states. Processes selected to run read sI and sP, change their own state, and update yI and yP atomically. In Fig. 8 , instruction ªreadY vº reads input register and stores its contents in v, and ªwriteY vº writes the contents of local variable v to output register . Fig. 9 shows an SMV program that describes the ringorientation algorithm under the d-daemon. In the SMV program, module p specifies the behavior of each process p i and its output registers iYiÀI and iYiI . We use the same technique as the previous example in order to model the fact that for each process p i two distinct situations can occur, that is, e I can be either p iÀI or p iI . Table 5 shows the results of verifying this algorithm. The results indicate that the algorithm does not work under the d-daemon. By examining a counterexample that SMV produced, we found that there is a fair computation that never reaches the legitimate states. Fig. 10 shows part of one such a computation. Here for every process p i , e I p iI and e P p iÀI are assumed. In this part of the computation, g I and g IQ are the same global state, and there is no process that is not selected to run. Thus, one can see that
Á is a fair computation and does not reach any legitimate state.
We investigated the cause of such livelock and found that it may occur when Rule 2a and Rule 2b, which are the only rules that can change the value of dir, are applied to two neighboring processes at the same time. In [26] , livelock freedom is proved based on the fact that such a case never occurs (Lemma 4). Therefore, the proof does not hold for the original algorithm. For example, consider the transition Fig. 10 . In this transition, p H changes its direction according to Rule 2a, while for p I , two rules are applied consecutively. First, Rule 5a is applied, which means that lel H and dir p hold temporarily. Then Rule 2b is applied and the state of p P finally becomes rY f. One way to prevent the occurrence of such a situation is to ensure that no more than one rule is applied to each process at a time, and this makes Lemma 4 in [26] hold. since the remaining part is the same as in Fig. 9 , except that tmp_label and tmp_dir can be omitted.)
VERIFYING SELF-STABILIZATION USING SPIN
For comparison purposes, we present the results of using another model checker, called SPIN [12] , to verify a selfstabilizing algorithm in this section. SPIN is a very fast model checker based on explicit state enumeration, and like SMV, it is widely available. In addition to various techniques for efficient verification, SPIN incorporates a different state reduction approach than symbolic representation. This approach, called partial order reduction, has been proven to be very successful in verifying concurrent systems and communication protocols [8] , [12] , [27] . It is based on the observation that the validity of a given correctness property is often insensitive to the order in which current and independently executed events are interleaved. Given an initial state, these techniques generate a reduced set of reachable states that is indistinguishable for the given property, instead of generating the whole reachable state space.
The input language for SPIN is called PROMELA; Fig. 13 shows a PROMELA program for the Dijkstra's K-state mutual exclusion algorithm under the c-daemon. This program is a modification of the one proposed in [23] . Since the original program only modeled the algorithm under the condition that an initial state is given, we added if statements to enforce each process to nondeterministically change its state in the first move of the process. Also, an initial state must be specified in a PROMELA program, therefore this program sets the initial state of each process to 0. Due to these modifications, however, the algorithm is allowed to start with any global state. Unfortunately, the modifications do not preserve the closure property. In the rest of this section, therefore, we limit our discussion to verification of the convergence property.
SPIN adopts Linear Time Logic (LTL) [18] to specify the property to be verified. Since the CTL formula used for representing the legitimate states of the K-state algorithm is not expressible in LTL, to signify the convergence property we use LTL formula AF legitimte, where
(For the formal definition of LTL, the readers are referred to, for example, [4] . ) We applied SPIN to the K-state algorithm with and without enabling partial order reduction. Table 6 shows the verification times of SPIN. An NA in the table indicates that the verification was not completed due to memory shortage. The results show that the use of SPIN is not feasible unless the number of processes is small, and that it is more vulnerable to the state explosion problem than symbolic model checking. It can also be seen that for this example partial order reduction did not work effectively and even worsened the performance. By comparing the results with those presented in Table 1 , we conclude that the proposed method is superior in terms of verification performance.
Nevertheless, we expect that SPIN can be more useful than SMV for verification of self-stabilizing communication protocols (e.g., [10] , [24] ), because typically in such protocols, only two processes are involved, and communications between processes are implemented by message passing. In SPIN, such communication can easily be modeled by using communication commands in PROMELA. Although this topic is beyond the scope of the paper, we consider it one of the possible directions of future study.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed to use symbolic model checking to verify distributed algorithms against the self-stabilizing property. We presented an approach in which the SMV system can be used for this purpose, and showed the effectiveness of the proposed approach, by using it to verify several algorithms. During the verification process, we found an error in one of these algorithms. Due to the nature of model checking, the proposed approach is applicable only when the number of processes is modest. However, we believe that this approach is useful for designing selfstabilizing algorithms, since, as demonstrated in this paper, it can help designers to detect and correct errors in the algorithms.
There are many directions for future work. For example, applicability of model checking techniques other than symbolic model checking need to be further examined; in particular, the use of symmetry seems likely to be effective for state reduction, because self-stabilizing systems appearing in the literature frequently exhibit considerable symmetry (uniform systems [11] , [13] , [14] , [26] are such typical examples).
Although model checking has an advantage because it can be performed automatically, there will always be situations where theorem proving is required for complete verification, since model checking can only be applied to finite state systems. A new research direction in formal verification attempts to combine model checking and mechanical theorem proving (e.g., [21] ). Application of this new approach to self-stabilizing systems also deserves further study.
Recently, some unique techniques have been proposed to reason about self-stabilizing systems; for example, in [25] , control theory is applied for this purpose. In [1] , the use of string rewriting systems is suggested to model and verify self-stabilizing rings. Extension of these approaches, including their automation, is also an interesting research topic. 
